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Abstract
This paper proposes an innovative solution to distribute free allowances to the
cement sector under emissions trading systems, called hybrid output-based allocation (OBA). We demonstrate that unlike many of the allocation methods
currently being used, our design provides incentives which are aligned with
the mitigation options available to this sector in the short to medium term.
Specifically, it increases the incentive to improve the carbon intensity of clinker
production; reduces the incentive to import clinker to avoid carbon costs; increases the incentive to use more low-carbon clinker alternatives to produce
cement; and finally it reduces excess allocation and reduces incentives to inflate
production volumes to obtain more free allowances. The hybrid OBA does not,
however, provide incentives to reduce the consumption of cement or to bring
about break-through technologies, hence should be considered as a mid-term
solution to aid the decarbonization of the cement sector in conjunction with
other support mechanisms.

Key-words
Emissions Trading; Output-based Allocation; Climate Policy; Cement sector; Clinker dilemma
1. Introduction
In any emissions trading systems (ETS), providing economic incentives to
improve environmental performance while effectively protect regulated sectors
against carbon leakage1 is an important part of its long-term success. A primary
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induced by a regional climate policy (Reinaud, 2008). This emissions increase in the rest of
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fear is that different carbon prices will continue to persist internationally and
without effective leakage measures, higher carbon price will induce production
and emissions to shift abroad.
Existing trading schemes provide free allocation to Energy-Intensive Trade
Exposed (EITE) sectors, typically based on historic emission or historic production volumes, to provide protection from carbon leakage. Here, the number of
free allowances is fixed ex ante. The EU ETS, Kazakhstan ETS, South Korea
ETS, and the Chinese ETS pilots all use ex ante allocation.2 However, there
is concern that this method provides weak incentives to drive down emissions.
Moreover, it does not adequately prevent carbon because ex ante free allocation
simply represents a lump-sum transfer to company owners and the carbon price
will pass through to consumers where possible. Operational choices remain unaltered, and incentives to sell unused free allowances and offshore production
(and import into the regulated region) are not eliminated.
To move towards a more robust protection against potential leakage, broadly
two options have been put forward. The first option, and the one often recommended by economists as the first-best option is border levelling (or border
carbon adjustments, BCAs) combined with full auctioning (Cramton and Kerr,
2002; Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Hepburn et al., 2006). The direct sale of allowances by auctioning has significant economic advantages over free allocation.
It maximizes the incentive for all emission reduction levers (energy efficiency,
fuel switching, breakthrough technologies and demand substitution) (Neuhoff
et al., 2014), removes windfall profits to polluters, treats incumbent and new
firms on an equal basis, and avoids many other distortions that arise with free
allocation. The value of the auction revenues can be used to reduce other distortionary taxes and improve macroeconomic efficiency. However, there remain
many aspects to be thoroughly investigated for implementing BCAs, including legal, practical and political feasibility. Using BCAs in conjunction with
auctioning to address carbon leakage is heavily discussed (such as in the now
defunct Waxman-Markey bill), but has not yet been implemented in practice.
The second option to counteract leakage is an ex post or output-based allocation (OBA) where free allocation is linked to actual output levels, multiplied by
a benchmark. This means that excess allocation and windfall profits are avoided,
and the benchmarks provide a focal point for energy efficiency improvements
if set at sufficiently ambitious levels. This method ensures better the prevention of carbon leakage, because companies incur only the costs of allowances
to cover emissions exceeding the benchmark rate, hence limited costs are borne
by producers and potentially passed onto product prices. However, OBA is by
no means a panacea. Because there is limited carbon cost pass through, con-

the world would be due to (i) a shift of carbon-intensive goods manufacture, caused by an
asymmetry of carbon costs (competitiveness channel) (ii) an accrued use of fossil fuels, made
cheaper worldwide by a consumption fall in the regulated region (international fossil fuel price
channel).
2 Some ex post adjustment is also possible in the EU ETS for low activity installations, and
also in the Shanghai and Shenzhen pilot schemes (ICAP, 2015).
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sumers will have limited economic incentive to use carbon intensive products
more efficiently or to switch to low-carbon alternatives hence mitigation from
demand substitution is forgone. With a limited carbon price signal to the producers, there is also limited incentive to develop new breakthrough technologies
to reduce carbon emissions, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). Political
obstacles are lower for OBA than for the first option. Indeed, it is currently
used in the California-Quebec ETS (the two ETS linked in 2014) and in the
New Zealand ETS.
Acknowledging its key limitations, this paper focuses on the second option
- OBA - as a mechanism to address carbon leakage. One prominent issue arising from OBA applied to the cement sector is the so-called “clinker dilemma”
(Demailly and Quirion, 2006; Quirion, 2009; Fischer and Fox, 2012). 90% to
95% of emissions in the cement sector are due to the manufacturing of clinker,
an intermediary product. If allowances are distributed in proportion to clinker
production (clinker OBA), the incentive to reduce the share of clinker in cement,
which has been the main driver of abatement in the cement industry (Branger
and Quirion, 2015), is neutralized. Conversely, if allowances are distributed
in proportion to production levels of the downstream product cement (cement
OBA), there is an incentive for the producer to import clinker (causing carbon
leakage), and sell allowances corresponding to saved emissions.3 The clinker
dilemma is not fully addressed in the current schemes using OBA.4 . Yet the
cement industry is the second largest manufacturing sector in terms of emissions (in 2012-2013 it represented 6% of EU ETS emissions, steel standing for
7% (EUTL)), hence emissions at stake in the “clinker dilemma” are important,
which makes a case for an adequate policy tackling this issue.
This paper investigates the design of OBA to solve the clinker dilemma. It
propose an innovative allowance distribution method for the cement sector called
hybrid output-based allocation. As the name suggests, this method combines
two benchmarks: one for the carbon intensity of clinker and another for the
clinker to cement ratio. Uniquely, we propose expand the scope of mitigation
by including clinker grinding stations as ETS installations. This is in contrast
to most existing schemes’ rules which cover only integrated clinker-cement pro3 It is worth noting that the decision on whether to use clinker or cement output for the
allocation base is also necessary in the context of ex ante allocation. Indeed, in the EU ETS
Phase 3 (2013-2020) allocation discussions, a controversy emerged on whether to base ex ante
free allocation levels on cement or clinker output and benchmark. However, the choice between
using cement or clinker output does not have the same consequences with an ex ante and ex
post allocation rules. With ex ante allocation, such a choice gives rise only to distributional
implications but not incentives implications. Choosing a cement benchmark with ex ante
allocation would have involved distributing more allowances to companies that historically
had a low “clinker to cement ratio" i.e high carbon intensity cement, but the incentive to
lower the clinker ratio would have remained identical. With ex post OBA, however, the choice
impacts both. This study focuses on the incentive implications of these allocation rules in the
context of output-based allocation.
4 See section 8 for a study of incentives in California-Quebec and New Zealand ETS. See also
section 4.2 for the benefits of including grinding stations, which are excluded from CaliforniaQuebec and New Zealand ETS, to address the clinker dilemma.
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ducing installations. We use a simple model to show that the proposed scheme
is superior to allocation methods currently used and provides incentives which
are aligned with the mitigation options available to this sector in the short to
medium term. Specifically, our hybrid OBA design gives the right incentives
in terms of decarbonisation of the cement sector: decreasing the clinker carbon
intensity and the clinker ratio without offshoring clinker production. As mentioned, OBA does not incentivise break-through technologies or demand side
substitution, hence these two mitigation channels are not explicitly modelled in
this analysis. We also conducted interviews with both industry executives in
major cement companies in Europe, as well as EU policy makers, in order to
guide the choices of implementation details. While the previous literature on
ex ante allocation has shown how incentive distortions can arise from allocation
rules (Neuhoff et al., 2006; Branger et al., 2015), this paper represents the first
to do so in the context of ex post allocation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review
on output-based allocation. Section 3 sets the bases for the analysis: cement
production is briefly explained, notations are introduced and the different OBA
allocation methodologies are presented, including the new hybrid OBA proposal. Section 4 assesses the key advantages of hybrid OBA, by illustrating its
incentive properties relative to OBA with a cement or clinker benchmark, and
the implication of these different rules on fluctuation of free allocation volume.
Section 5 discusses the possible implementation issues hybrid OBA, using a case
study of the EU ETS. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
Studies on OBA are not as numerous as studies on border carbon adjustments, the other prominent leakage mitigation policy. Still, the economic literature has well documented the core economic mechanisms involved in OBA,
which are the following.
Firstly, by diminishing the perceived carbon cost of home production, OBA
levels the carbon playing field, protects the competitiveness of home energyintensive industry and reduces carbon leakage compared to full auctioning or
grandfathering (Jensen and Rasmussen, 2000; Bohringer and Lange, 2005; Demailly and Quirion, 2006, 2008; Fischer and Fox, 2012). Secondly, it suppresses
windfall profits that may occur with ex ante allocation as allocation is adjusted
to output (Quirion, 2009). Thirdly, incentives for developing and adopting
abatement technologies are preserved (Sterner and Muller, 2008; Zetterberg,
2014), i.e. abatement takes place up to the level where its marginal costs equal
the marginal payments for emissions.
These three features are desirable, but the following fourth may not be. By
granting more allowances for each additional output produced, OBA acts as a
production subsidy. As allowances are lost if production is avoided, allowances
do not have and opportunity cost and then carbon price signal is not passed
to consumers. Therefore, compared to grandfathering or auctioning, it provides
less incentive to reduce the production and consumption of polluting goods. In
4

the absence of other market failures, the output reduction is then lower than the
social optimum, inducing higher overall costs for a given emissions reductions
target (Fischer, 2001; Haites, 2003). However in the presence of market failures,
such as imperfect coverage (Bernard et al., 2007; Holland, 2012), tax interactions
(Goulder, 2002) or imperfect competition (Gersbach and Requate, 2004; Fischer,
2011), the combination of emissions pricing and production subsidy may be
welfare-enhancing in theory.
These theoretical effects have been assessed with numerical models that provide several key messages. First, the effect of the implicit subsidy can have
significant impact on the allowance price. Fischer and Fox (2007) find that in
the US context, the allowance price is considerably higher (44%) under OBA
applied to all sectors compared to the other scenarios. The allowance price
increase is even higher in Golombek et al. (2013) who focus on the European
electricity sector with an extensive numerical model.
Second, OBA bear much less distributional issues at the international level
(Böhringer et al., 2012), because they do not provide foreign competitors the
incentive to improve the carbon efficiency of production (Fischer and Fox, 2012).
However, distributional issues within the abating region are important if OBA
does not apply to all sectors. (Fischer and Fox, 2007) find that the emissions
reduction burden under OBA shifts from heavy historical producers towards
other sectors such as agriculture, construction and final demand.
Third, OBA is outperformed by economy-wide border carbon adjustments
in terms of carbon leakage according to most CGE model studies (Böhringer
et al., 2012, 2014). However, some models incorporating market failures show
that combining auctioning with OBA targeted to energy intensive sectors may
be more cost-effective than auctioning alone. This result is obtained by Lennox
and van Nieuwkoop (2010) for New Zealand and in the US context by Fischer
and Fox (2010) but is not reproduced using the same model for Japan (Takeda
et al., 2014).
Fourth, as the coalition gets larger, the efficiency cost of implicit output
subsidies ultimately outweigh the benefits from reducing emissions leakage, suggesting that OBA is advantageous only in cases where few countries undertake
climate policy (Böhringer et al., 2014).
Finally, two models with a more detailed representation of the cement sector give additional insights. (Fowlie et al., 2012) develop a dynamic model
with incumbents and entrants of the US cement industry incorporating two features: oligopolistic competition (which calls for a carbon tax lower than the
marginal damage, as pointed out by Buchanan (1969)) and leakage (imports
are introduced through a competitive fringe). The comparison of four policies
(grandfathering, auctioning, border tax adjustment and OBA) regarding different exogenous social carbon costs show that in terms of welfare, OBA is the
least-worst (but still negative) policy for carbon prices under 45 dollars (being
dominated by border tax adjustments otherwise), mostly because other policies
induce divestiture and exit leading to increased concentration of the industry.
Meunier et al. (2014) using a model that incorporates existing capacities and
demand uncertainty find that the optimal rate (in allowances per ton of clinker
5

produced) for OBA would be almost three times lower than the actual one in
Europe.
Overall, there seems to be consensus that OBA, targeted only to energyintensive industries, represents an attractive option as a mechanism to tackle
carbon leakage concerns. However, the overall costs and distributional effects
are such that it is likely to be a transitory measure to compensate sectors in the
short run until more permanent and efficient solutions are put in place to address the priorities for emissions trading i.e. efficiency, equity and effectiveness
(carbon leakage). Papers such as Quirion (2009) and Heilmayr and Bradbury
(2011) suggest that in the longer run, it is socially efficient that the industrial
sectors bare a larger share of the emissions reduction burden, as marginal abatement costs tend to be higher in other sectors such as transport and agriculture
which have fewer low cost abatement options.
Our study is the first one to examine the detailed design of OBA and specifically a hybrid OBA for the cement sector.
3. Modelling allocation to the cement sector
3.1. The cement manufacturing process and abatement levers
Cement manufacturing can be divided in two main steps: clinker manufacturing (90% to 95% of emissions, virtually all from direct emissions), and
blending and grinding clinker with other materials to produce cement (generating indirect emissions due to electricity use). Clinker is produced by the
calcination of limestone in a rotating kiln, which emits carbon dioxide through
two channels. First, the chemical reaction itself releases carbon dioxide (around
0.53 tCO2 per ton of clinker) which accounts for roughly two thirds of carbon
emissions in clinker manufacture. These so-called process emissions cannot be
easily reduced.5 The remaining CO2 comes from the burning of fossil fuel to
heat the kiln.
The two broad options to decrease cement carbon intensity are: i) decreasing
the clinker carbon intensity6 and ii) reducing the clinker to cement ratio i.e.
substituting clinker with alternative, low-carbon constituents of cement such
as blast furnace slag or fly ash.7 The availability of these substitutes varies
across regions (Müller, 2012). Alternatively, producers can also reduce their own
emissions locally by replacing own clinker production with imported clinker. If
the imported clinker is not subject to a carbon price, then this offshoring of
clinker production causes carbon leakage and does not reduce global emissions.
5 They can only be stored (with CCS), or avoided, through reduced production or alternative cements which are at the development stage, such as Novacem (based on magnesium
silicates rather than limestone), Calera or Geopolymer (Schneider et al., 2011).
6 To decrease the clinker carbon intensity, one can decrease the energy intensity of the kiln,
or use alternative fuels which are less carbon intensive (like biomass). For a detailed analysis
of the abatement levers and the decomposition of emissions in the European cement industry,
see (Branger and Quirion, 2015).
7 These being by-product of other industries or natural resources, have a much lower carbon
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Table 1: Variables

Notation
BC
BK
BR
IK
R
QC
QK
QH
K
QO
K
QIK
τI
τE

Definition
Benchmark for cement carbon intensity
Benchmark for clinker carbon intensity
Benchmark for clinker ratio
Actual clinker carbon intensity of the plant
QH + QIK
Actual clinker ratio of the plant ( K
)
QC
Cement produced on site
and released onto the market
O
Clinker produced on site (QH
K + QK )
Clinker produced on site
and used on site to produce cement
Clinker produced on site
and exported
Clinker imported
and used to produce cement on site
QI
Clinker Import Ratio ( H K I )
QK + QK
QO
Clinker Export Ratio ( H K O )
QK + QK

3.2. Analytical framework
To our knowledge, technical parameters representing abatement levers have
never been modelled when studying allocation methods. Usually, a generic
abatement function is used and allocation enters the profit function of a firm
or sector (the carbon cost is the product of the carbon price and the difference
between emissions and allowances) as a simple function of historical output or
actual output (e.g. Demailly and Quirion (2006) and Fischer (2001)). Therefore,
our contribution is to assess precisely the impact that changes in the technical
parameters have on carbon costs.
Before detailing the different allocation rules, we first express cement emissions as a function of variables of interest, in order to separate out the different
levers of abatement. Notations and definition of variables are summarized in
Table 1.
Direct emissions are equal to:
O
E = IK × QK = IK (QH
K + QK )

(1)

IK is the clinker carbon intensity of the plant and QK the amount of clinker
produced on site, which is either used on site to produce cement (QH
K ), or
exported (QO
K ).

intensity than clinker.
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To produce cement, the plant may also import clinker (QIK ), so the clinker
ratio can be expressed as:
R=

I
QH
K + QK
QC

(2)

or equivalently the cement production can be expressed as:
QC =

I
QH
K + QK
R

(3)

QC is the cement produced and used by the final consumer. Strictly speaking, it represents the quantity produced and released into the market.
We define the clinker import ratio, which corresponds to the proportion of
clinker in the produced cement that has been imported:
τI =

QIK
I
QH
K + QK

(4)

We also define the clinker export ratio, which corresponds to the proportion
of clinker produced, that is exported hence not used on site to produce cement:

τE =

QO
K
+ QO
K

(5)

QH
K

Both τI and τE are comprised between 0 and 1. τI = 0 when the plant does
not import any clinker and τI = 1 when the plant imports all the clinker, for
example a separated grinding station. τE = 0 when the plant does not export
any clinker and τE = 1 when the plant exports all the clinker produced.8
Emissions in Equation (3) can be re-written as:
E = QC × R × IK ×

O
QH
1 − τI
K + QK
= QC × R × IK ×
H
1 − τE
QK + QIK

(6)

Within this framework, a plant has five control variables, which can be
distinguished between one quantitative (QC ) and four qualitative (IK , R, τI
and τE ). Beside reducing the amount of cement produced (QC &), we see that
emissions are reduced when the clinker carbon intensity is reduced (IK &) or
when the clinker-to-cement ratio is decreased (R &). The last factor relates
to trade. Emissions are decreased when more clinker is imported (τI %) hence
causing carbon leakage, or less clinker is exported (τE &).
An adequate policy would give incentive to reduce R and IK while staying
as neutral as possible regarding τI and τE .
8 There is only one such plant in Europe. Virtually all clinker facilities manufacture cement
as well (Ref. interviews with industry executives).
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3.3. Possible OBA allocation rules: cement, clinker or hybrid
We distinguish three types of rules for OBA: cement OBA (the output is the
quantity of cement), clinker OBA (the output is the quantity of clinker) and
hybrid OBA (using both outputs and the clinker ratio).
For cement OBA, allocations are equal to the cement benchmark BC multiplied by the cement production QC :
AC = BC × QC

(7)

For clinker OBA, allocations are equal to the clinker benchmark BK multiplied by the clinker production QK :
AK = BK × QK

(8)

The hybrid OBA we propose is similar to clinker OBA except for an additional term, rewarding (or discouraging) a low (high) clinker ratio with more
(fewer) allowances:
AHyb = BK × QK + BK (BR − R) × QC

(9)

The originality of this hybrid OBA design comes from this relatively straightforward and single formula. As we will see, this allocation method ensures
proper incentives (see section 4.1) and includes all installations (grinding plants
and clinker producing facilities) so that the scope of mitigation is expanded,
while being neutral regarding the production location (see section 4.2). In what
way this equation differs from the California-Quebec and New Zealand allocation rules for cement is discussed in Section 8.
The allocations formulas for the clinker and the hybrid OBA can be rewritten in order to ease the comparison with emissions from Equation (6)
AK = BK × QK
O
= BK × [QH
K + QK ]
1 − τI
× QC
= BK × R ×
1 − τE

(10)

AHyb = BK × QK + BK (BR − R) × QC
O
= BK × [QH
K + QK ] + BK (BR − R) × QC
1 − τI
= [BK × R ×
+ BK (BR − R)] × QC
1 − τE
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(11)

4. Key advantages of hybrid OBA
4.1. Incentive properties
We show that the different OBA allocation methodologies (cement, clinker
or hybrid) give incentives to varying degrees on the three different levers of
abatement: reducing the carbon intensity of clinker (IK ), increasing the clinker
import ratio (τI , we consider τE = 0, that is no exports, throughout the analysis)
and reducing the clinker ratio in cement (R).
Previously, the impact of allocation methods have been modelled using both
general equilibrium and partial equilibrium models to quantify outcome variables. Here, we use an alternative, simple approach involving two steps. First,
we compute the marginal carbon cost of cement under the three possible OBA
allocation methodologies. Then we vizualise the influence of the three parameters on the marginal carbon cost of cement using graphics representing “isocarboncost curves”.9 Because there are more than one variable influencing the
marginal carbon costs, we compute isocarboncost curves equations and display
two figures for each benchmark method: the plan (R vs. IK , left) holds τI
constant and the plan (τI vs. IK , right) holds R constant.
Using Equation (6) and the previous formulas, we can compute the marginal
cost of carbon in cement, which is equal in this case to the mean cost of carbon,
E−A
, for the three allocation methodologies:
QC
M CC =

1 − τI
× R × IK − BC
1 − τE

(12)

M CK =

1 − τI
× R × [IK − BK ]
1 − τE

(13)

M CHyb =

1 − τI
× R × [IK − BK ] + BK (R − BR )
1 − τE

(14)

The equation of isocarboncosts curves are:
M C 0 + BC
(1 − τI )IK
M C 0 + BC
⇐⇒ τI = 1 − (1 − τE )
IK R

M CC = M C 0 ⇐⇒ R = (1 − τE )

(15)

9 This method is an application of the isocost curves used in standard microeconomic theory
e.g. Varian (2009).
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M C0
(1 − τI )(IK − BK )
M C0
⇐⇒ τI = 1 − (1 − τE )
(IK − BK )R

M CK = M C 0 ⇐⇒ R = (1 − τE )

M C 0 + BK BR
(1 − τI )IK + (τE − τI )BK
M C 0 + BK (BR − R)
⇐⇒ τI = 1 − (1 − τE )
(IK − BK )R

(16)

M CHyb = M C 0 ⇐⇒ R = (1 − τE )

(17)

Figure 1 displays the isocarboncost curves for the three types of OBA (cement, clinker, and hybrid). The parameters values cover a wide range: 40% to
100% for the clinker ratio R, 0% to 40% for the clinker import ratio τI , and 0.5
to 1.2 tCO2 per ton of clinker for the clinker carbon intensity IK .
The following explanations with isocarboncosts can apply to a single cement plant, or to a whole company with several plants, using mean values of
parameters at the company level.
In the following we use clinker carbon intensity benchmark values BK =766
kgCO2 per ton of clinker (like in the EU ETS), cement carbon intensity benchmark BC =450 kgCO2 per ton of cement (same methodology with the Getting the Number Rights (GNR) data (WBCSD, 2009)) and clinker-ratio BR =
BK
=59% (the hybrid and cement OBAs then have the same stringency, see
BC
Section 5.1 for the determination of the benchmark values). Furthermore we
suppose τE =0% (always), τI =0% in R vs. IK graphs, and R=72% (European
average in 2012) in τI vs. IK graphs, and refer to mean or marginal carbon cost
of cement simply as “carbon cost of cement”.
All points belonging to one curve share the same carbon cost of cement. For
example (see Figure 1a), with a cement benchmark, in terms of carbon cost,
producing cement with a clinker ratio of 90% and a clinker intensity of 0.670
tCO2 per ton of clinker is equivalent to producing cement with a clinker ratio
of 70% and a clinker intensity of 0.850 tCO2 per ton of clinker (without any
imports or exports). For both, the carbon cost of cement is 0.15 EUAs per ton
of cement.
When isocarboncost curves are diagonal, abatement options are substitutable
while when they are horizontal or vertical they are not. Figures 1a and 1b show
that under cement OBA, the three levers of emissions reduction are in some
way substitutable. Let us consider a plant with R=72%, IK =0.835 tCO2 per
ton of clinker, τE =0%, and τI =0%. The carbon cost of cement is 0.15 EUAs
per ton of cement. To reduce this cost to 0.05 EUAs per ton of cement, one can
either reduce the clinker ratio to 60%, reduce clinker carbon intensity to 0.695
tCO2 per ton of clinker (Figure 1a), or increase the clinker import ratio to 17%
(which means producing only 83% of the clinker and importing the rest). While
11

(a) Cement OBA - R vs. IK

(b) Cement OBA - τI vs. IK

(c) Clinker OBA - R vs. IK

(d) Clinker OBA - τI vs. IK

(e) Hybrid OBA - R vs. IK

(f) Hybrid OBA - τI vs. IK

Figure 1: Isocarboncosts curves. From lighter to darker: -0.05, 0, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15
EUA/tCement. Reminder: if 1EUA=10e, then 0.10 EUA per ton of cement translates into
1eper ton of cement. Benchmark values are at BK =766 kgCO2 per ton of clinker, BC =450
BK
kgCO2 per ton of cement, and BR =
=59%. We suppose τE =0% (always), τI =0% in R
BC
vs. IK graphs, and R=72% (European average in 2012) in τI vs. IK graphs.
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the benchmark gives the correct incentives to reduce R and IK , these incentives
are dampened by the option to abate via increasing imports. This is because
reducing R to 60% is relatively challenging in the short term10 , as is adjusting
IK to 0.695 tCO2 per ton of clinker11 . In comparison, clinker trade volumes
fluctuate rapidly in response to the imbalance between domestic capacity and
demand (Neuhoff et al., 2014). One could argue based on past experience that
for relatively low carbon price, the (transport and other trade-related) cost of
importing clinker is high enough compared to the potential gain in allowances,
such that the risk of carbon leakage with a cement benchmark is not significant.12 Nonetheless the situation may change if carbon price differentials with
trading partners become more important.
Isocarboncost curves for clinker OBA (Figures 1c and 1d) are very different:
curves are much more vertical suggesting the mitigation options are less substitutable. When producing at the clinker benchmark level in terms of clinker
carbon intensity (BK =766 kgCO2 per ton of clinker), changing the clinker ratio
or the clinker import ratio has no effect whatsoever in terms of the carbon cost
of cement. Conversely, when producing below the benchmark (“clean” clinker),
there is an incentive to increase R and decrease τI (or increase τE ) to increase
carbon benefits. Now let us consider a plant producing above the benchmark
(“dirty” clinker), for which R=72%, IK =0.980 tCO2 per ton of clinker and
τI =0%. Again, the initial carbon cost of cement is 0.15 EUAs per ton of cement and the aim is to reduce this to 0.05 EUA per ton. Here, the plant could:
reduce IK from 0.980 tCO2 per ton to 0.840 tCO2 per ton of clinker; decrease
R to 25%; or increase τI to 70%. Thus, this is an attractive approach in terms
of preventing carbon leakage because the incentive to marginally increase τI is
limited, unlike with a cement benchmark. While imports are not explicitly discriminated nor a level playing field is achieved between domestic and imported
clinker, we demonstrate that having a clinker benchmark goes a long way to discourage efforts to increase the share of imported clinker. The major downside
of clinker OBA, instead, is that it fails to create robust incentives to reduce the
clinker content of cement.
Isocarboncost curves of hybrid OBA (Figures 1e and 1f) present the same
characteristics as cement OBA for the R vs. IK diagram, and the same characteristics as clinker OBA for the τI vs. IK diagram13 . In other words, hybrid
OBA combines the best of both worlds - it gives the incentive to reduce R and
10 Historically, the decline in average clinker ratio has been slow globally. In Europe, it
declined from 78.4 to 72.5 over the period 1990 to 2012 Ref. GNR
11 Between 1990 and 2012, the average clinker carbon intensity declined from 0.913 to 0.842
globally, and from 0.911 to 0.841 in Europe. Ref. GNR
12 Indeed, with the current allocation system (mostly independent of production), clinker
offshoring allows to benefit from the full opportunity cost of allowances, but econometric
studies have not revealed any statistical evidence of an impact of carbon price on clinker net
imports (Branger et al., 2013).
13 The left shift of the isocarboncosts curves between Figure 1d and Figure 1f is because for
τI vs. IK diagrams, R=75% (>BR ), so for a given τI and IK , hybrid OBA is more costly. It
would be the opposite if R was lower than the clinker-to-cement benchmark.
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IK , while neutralising the incentive to increase τI . Let us consider the same
plant as the cement OBA example (for which R=72%, IK =0.835 tCO2 per ton
of clinker and τI =0%, with a carbon cost of 0.15 EUA per ton of cement).
Again, to reduce the carbon cost to 0.05 EUA per ton of cement, the hybrid
OBA provides the correct incentives - the plant can either reduce the clinker
ratio to 60% or reduce the clinker carbon intensity to 0.695 tCO2 per ton of
clinker. However, the incentive to increase clinker imports is dampened because
even when offshoring 100% of clinker production, the carbon cost would decrease
only marginally to 0.10 EUA.
In practice, changing the clinker ratio, the clinker carbon intensity or the
clinker import ratio generates costs
depending on many factors, some of which being global or regional (such
as energy prices or clinker price on the market) and some of which being local (availability of clinker substitutes or alternative fuels, transport costs, etc).
Each company makes its own optimisation plans and can assess if changing
a configuration of cement production is profitable depending on the allowance
price. This analysis does not allow for producing quantitative predictions of outcomes (clinker ratio, clinker carbon intensity and clinker trade at the European
level) depending on the different OBA rules. It would necessitate a substantial
amount of data at the plant and company level (which is clearly out of reach of
this study) on top of a complex optimisation model.
Nonetheless, we demonstrated that hybrid OBA induces the same incentive
as cement OBA to decrease the clinker ratio and the carbon intensity, and that
it induces the same (dis)incentive as clinker OBA to offshore clinker. Therefore,
provided implementation costs (discussed in the next section) are not too high,
hybrid OBA should be preferred to either a cement or clinker OBA.
4.2. Increasing the scope of mitigation by encouraging clinker substitution across
all facilities
We can distinguish two broad types of facilities producing cement:
• “Traditional” or integrated cement plants, producing clinker and cement.
There are about 180-190 of such facilities in operation in Europe in 2013.14
Depending on the plant, clinker imports or exports may be more or less
important compared to home production.
• Separated grinding stations, which do not produce clinker, but produce cement with clinker produced elsewhere. This process consumes electricity,
so in the first approximation these plants have no direct emissions but only
indirect emissions due to electricity use. They nonetheless influence overall cement sector emissions, because their choice of clinker ratio influences
clinker production volumes (and thus direct emissions) elsewhere. The
majority of grinding stations are owned by companies producing clinker,
14 Source:

EUTL.
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although there is a small number of independent grinding stations belonging to companies only buying clinker in the market. The bulk of clinker
used in a typical grinding station comes from the closest clinker plant
owned by the same company as the cheapest source of clinker. However,
this is changing over time, as inter-company clinker trade has been increasing in recent years, and a grinding station may receive clinker from
several plants.
Unlike an allocation scheme based on a clinker benchmark, which by definition applies only to installations producing clinker, a cement or hybrid OBA
can also be applied to separate grinding stations. Including grinding stations
improves the efficiency under the hybrid OBA scheme because:
• Grinding stations play a key role in driving down the clinker ratio in
the sector as a whole, typically being located close to sources of clinker
substitutes. Indeed, interviews with cement executives confirmed that the
availability of substitutes was one of the main determinants for the location
of grinding stations, along with access to port facilities and location of
demand. Excluding them from the scheme is therefore inconsistent with
providing incentives to fully leverage the mitigation potential in this sector
via clinker ratio reduction.
• Excluding grinding stations under hybrid OBA could further pave way
to possible distortions, because companies would be incentivised to produce low clinker content cement in integrated plants (to receive more allowances) and shift the clinker output to produce high clinker content
cement in grinding stations outside of the scheme.
Therefore, by including grinding stations into the scheme, the proposed hybrid OBA allocation design expands the scope of mitigation of the cement sector,
providing incentives to maximise clinker substitution across all facilities. It also
ensures that the location of the cement production (whether it is in an integrated plant or in a grinding station) has no impact on the amount of allocation
received, hence this method is neutral regarding the production location, other
parameters being constant.15 This is in contrast to existing schemes that do
not include grinding stations hence fails to provide strong economic incentives to
maximise the use of clinker alternatives available and make low-carbon cement
in grinding stations.
15 As a simple example, let us consider a company producing Q
C cement with a clinker
ratio R (so we have QK = R × QC ). An integrated plant would receive the allocaBR
tion AIntegratedP lant = BK × QK + BK (BR − R) × QC = BK × QK ×
. In case
R
of production in two separated installations, the clinker-producing plant would receive
AClinkerP lant = BK × QK (first “part” of AIntegratedP lant ) and the grinding station would
receive AGrindingStation = BK (BR − R) × QC (second “part” of AIntegratedP lant ) so the
total allocation is similar as if it was made by an integrated plant. We can verify that it is
still the case in a more complex configuration with imports, exports, incomplete transfer of
clinker to the grinding station, and production of cement on both sites.
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Figure 2: Total EU ETS allowances volume for cement under a cement OBA (C), hybrid OBA
(H) and clinker OBA (K)(in millions of EUAs).

4.3. Minimizing fluctuation of allocation volume
Another key advantage with the hybrid OBA is that compared to cement
or clinker OBA, fluctuations of the total volume of allowances to the sector are
minimised. To illustrate this, Figure 2 displays the level of the cement sector
allocation for the EU ETS, under different allocation methodologies: cement
OBA (C), hybrid OBA (H) and clinker OBA (K). We compare the case with
high production levels and high imports against the case with low production
and high exports, also contrasting high or low average clinker ratios (only impacting clinker OBA). The orders of magnitude of production and trade are
intended to be realistic. High production corresponds to pre-crisis production
at the EU ETS level. Low production corresponds to 2013 production. Clinker
net imports in the EU 27 were at 14.1 Mt in 2007 (their highest just before the
crisis) and clinker net exports were at 7.6 Mt in 2013.16
Changes in the total volume of allowances to the sector are first and foremost
driven by changes in production. By definition, in OBA changes in production
induce changes in total allocation in similar proportion. However, the magnitude
of the changes is lower in the hybrid OBA: [80-106], compared to the cement
and clinker benchmarks with [72-117] and [81,148] respectively. Because typically the overall cap of the whole emissions trading system is fixed in line with
the region’s mitigation targets17 , the reduced uncertainty about the total OBA
16 Source: Eurostat: (cement clinker: 252310) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/setupdimselection.do.
Clinker imports may be higher in cement OBA, but their magnitude have no impact on the
total allocation (which only depends on the quantity of cement produced).
17 Approaches to incorporating OBA for a few carbon leakage sectors into a fixed cap scheme
will be discussed in Section 5.4.
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volume is clearly a desirable feature for an output-based allocation.
A change in the clinker ratio has a very important impact on the total allocation in clinker OBA (but as we explain there is not an incentive to reduce
the clinker ratio so the observed variation may not be as important). However,
the clinker ratio has no impact whatsoever on the total allocation for cement
and hybrid OBA. This is logical for cement OBA but could seem surprising for
hybrid OBA, as the clinker ratio is used in the computation of the allocation.
The reason is as follows. For a given cement production (and a given clinker
trade), when the clinker ratio decreases, less clinker has to be produced, so less
allowances are given in proportion of clinker output (the first part of hybrid
OBA allocation). But this allowances loss is exactly compensated by the “allowances bonus” rewarding the decrease of the clinker ratio (the second part of
hybrid OBA allocation). Therefore the industry receives the same number of
allowances, but emissions are lower because less clinker is produced, so the net
allowance balance is positive.
5. Potential implementation issues with hybrid OBA - A case study
of the EU ETS
In this section, we explore some of the implementation issues of the hybrid OBA using as a case study, the EU ETS. We conducted interviews with
both industry executives in major cement companies as well as policy makers
in Europe, in order to assess feasibility and options regarding the setting of the
benchmark, possible additional MRV and administrative challenges, confidentiality issues with data disclosure, inclusion of grinding stations, interactions
with the cross sectoral correction factor (CSCF), the impact on the overall cap
and compatibility with the World Trade Organization rules. Telephone interviews about one hour each were conducted on 11 individuals in 7 different EU
countries between May and July 2015.
5.1. Setting the benchmark
5.1.1. General principles
In terms of their levels, a number of possible options can be envisaged.
Benchmarks could reflect Best Available Technology (BAT), sector average, best
performers, including outliers (such as the average of the top 10% performing
installations) or excluding them (such as the 5th percentile), and so on. The
choice requires a trade-off between: providing incentives to improve performance
to regulated installations18 ; simplicity of the rules and harmonisation with other
sectors’ benchmarks; maximising auction revenues; mitigating the risk of carbon leakage/competitiveness losses, acceptability/ resistance from industry; and
minimising administrative burden. Clearly, benchmarks set at the BAT provides
18 Although in theory the amount of allocation received has no impact on abatement (Montgomery, 1972), several empirical studies showed that in reality there would be a greater
incentive to abate when short of allowances (Abrell et al., 2011; Venmans, 2014).
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the strongest signal for mitigation. Using the industry average is least likely to
encounter industry resistance. Allowing the outliers to be excluded reduces the
simplicity of the scheme and reduce rule harmonisation with other sectors.
In the EU ETS Phase 3, the European Commission set a guiding rule for the
definition of benchmarks: it should be computed as the average performance
in terms of kgCO2 per unit of output of the 10% best performing installations,
based on data in 2007-2008 (European Commission, 2009). The computed value
amounted to 766 kgCO2 per ton of clinker, which is used in this paper. In
interviews, we found that respondents favoured this general approach to be
applied in a context of hybrid OBA, as a good compromise between providing
a realistic abatement signal without punishing the industry leaders.
5.1.2. Combining two benchmarks
Applying the top 10% performance rule in a hybrid context in this sector,
however, can result in a more stringent benchmark on average and thus costlier
for the industry than a clinker benchmark. First, this is because of the unevenness of the distribution of cement carbon intensity (Figure 3b) relative to
clinker carbon intensity (Figure 3a),19 a hybrid OBA (similarly to a cement
OBA) would be more stringent on average and thus costlier for the industry
than a clinker benchmark. It would also imply a higher range of initial carbon costs across installations (plants with high clinker ratio and a high clinker
carbon intensity would be particularly penalized).
Second, the relatively high variance across plants in the clinker to cement
ratio curve implies that the average performance of the 10% best installations
deviates from the average and represents an ambitious level - approximately
45-50% (see Figure 3c).20 Combining together the two benchmarks (average
10% best performers for clinker carbon intensity multiplied by average 10% best
performers for clinker ratio) amplifies this deviation and leads to a stringency
level which may be considered unattainable.
One way to address this issue, while still adhering to the principle of setting
the benchmark at the average of 10% best performing installations, is to use an
inverse approach as follows. First, the average 10% best performers for cement
carbon intensity, BC is computed. Figure 3b suggests it would be around 450
BK
' 59%. This
kgCO2 per ton of cement.21 Then BR is computed as BR =
BC
19 GNR

provides results of linear regressions in the [10%,90%] range. The linear coefficient
for clinker is 1.17 whereas it is 2.34 for cement. This means that the interquartile interval is
58.5 kgCO2 per ton of clinker but 117 kgCO2 per ton of cement. However a caveat must be
pointed out. Contrary to the clinker distribution curve, the cement distribution curve is not
made with individual installations values but with national companies values (combining all
clinker and grinding installations of one company in a country), which “flattens” the curve
with an averaging effect (source: interview with industry executive). If the cement curve
would have been made with individual installations it would have been even steeper.
20 We consider in GNR the clinker to cement ratio and not the clinker to cement equivalent
ratio as the latter does not include pure substitutes. The clinker ratio in GNR is coherent
with our definition of proportion of clinker in cement.
21 Figure 3b includes white cement so the computed value is slightly overestimated.
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(a) Clinker carbon intensity (variable 331 in
GNR)

(b) Cement carbon intensity (variable 331 in
GNR). Cementitious refers to cement produced
as it excludes exported clinker) (variable 331 in
GNR)

(c) Clinker ratio

Figure 3: Distribution of clinker carbon intensity, cement carbon intensity and clinker ratio
in EU 28 in 2012. Source: WBCSD GNR Database
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methodology leads to a stringency equivalent to a cement OBA. This inverse
method allows to combin two 10% average benchmarks resulting in a “realistic”
hybrid benchmark. It is more favourable than to explicitly increasing the value
of BR above the average of the 10% performers, as it could set a precedent for
other sectors to negotiate preferential treatment.
5.1.3. Heterogeneity of clinker substitutes and clinker ratio benchmark
Setting a benchmark level for clinker is relatively straightforward given that
clinker is a highly homogeneous product. In conrast, setting a benchmark level
for the clinker to cement ratio is more difficult because a variety of cement
products exist with different technical properties mostly according to the different clinker substitutes used (Müller, 2012). The European Cement Standard
EN 197-1 differentiates eight types of Portland cement and three types of nonPortland cement depending on cement composition.
Furthermore, the availability of clinker substitutes varies considerably across
regions and companies. Fly ash and slag are abundant near coal-fired power
plants and steel factories respectively. Pozzolanas (volcanic rocks) are present
only in certain regions (in Europe Italy and Greece). Many interviewees expressed concerns that plants without an easy access to clinker substitutes would
be unjustly penalised.
In addition, production of some substitutes like slag requires significant capital investment, whereas fly ash as a by product from coal power plants requires
limited processing. Third, not all substitutes are equivalent. For example,
blending slag or burnt oil shale improves the strength of cement. Using limestone requires cement to be grounded finer.
From a climate policy perspective, what matters is the amount of clinker in
cement hence all constituents including fly ash from coal combustion, slag from
steel production, limestone, gypsum, pozzolana, silica fume and burnt oil shale
should be taken into account in the BR definition.
However, the apparent “unfairness” of hybrid OBA is not a good reason to
discard this policy. The same reasoning could be used against benchmarks, as
rewarding companies with efficient installations at the expense of companies
with inefficient plants. The objective of pricing carbon emissions in this sector
is precisely to lower the clinker ratio at the European level.
5.1.4. Updating benchmarks
The main trade-off in the decision on how often to revise the benchmarks is
between reflecting technological progress, providing predictability for industry
and administrative costs. We found in interviews that updating benchmarks
every Phase or trading period (whether 5, 8 or 10 years) is a popular option,
providing both predictability and administrative ease. Another way to enhance
long-term predictability is to announce a long-term trajectory in advance (e.g.
based on sector low-carbon road maps such as 400-450 tCO2 per ton of cement in
2050) and have an annually declining benchmark in line with these goals. This
approach has the additional benefit of better reflecting technological progress,
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giving the industry a clear signal as to the rate of mitigation improvement
necessary, and avoiding the cross sectoral correction factor (see Section 5.3)
5.2. Administrative costs and challenges
5.2.1. Monitoring, reporting and verification for OBA
In general under OBA (whether cement, clinker or hybrid), authorities have
to collect production data at the installation level on a yearly basis to compute
allocation at the installation level. Companies record clinker production at the
installation level, so for them additional costs of monitoring and reporting are
minimal.
However, additional costs are higher for the administrator. They would have
to set accounting methods, collect, verify and process the data as well as verify
their consistency at the macro level (with production and trade data). The main
costs will be upfront and the sequent costs will be proportional to the number
of installations. Hence, if limited to a few sectors, the ongoing MRV costs are
low as installation numbers are limited. In the context of the EU ETS, moving
from the current ex ante system to OBA would significantly decrease other
administrative costs specifically relating to new entrants, closure, and activity
level thresholds (on top of suppressing their perverse incentives (Branger et al.,
2015)).
In addition, we estimate that additional MRV costs compared to a clinker
OBA would be relatively low. On top of clinker production for clinker producing
plants, cement production and the yearly average clinker ratio for cement producing installations would also have to be reported. Companies closely monitor
these data for optimisation purposes, and most plants in Europe have already
been reporting much more detailed information within the Cement Sustainability Initiative, so supplementary costs for cement companies would also be very
small. Again, supplementary costs for the administrator may be higher (a tradeoff would have to be set between costs and accuracy) but are largely outweighed
by the benefits provided by hybrid OBA (a much bigger incentive to reduce the
clinker ratio).
5.2.2. Confidentiality issues around production data disclosure
In the case of clinker OBA or cement OBA, public disclosure of allocations would indirectly reveal production at the installation level (basically dividing them by the benchmark value22 ), which can clearly be considered anticompetitive information. To avoid possible collusions and disclosure of sensitive
data, one way to implement OBA in practice is to base the allocation in year t
on the output level with a lag of two years (t − 2). For example, the allocation
in 2021 would be based on the 2019 output. If there are concerns about large
22 However inferring production from allocation is not straightforward with hybrid OBA because of the second term involving the clinker-to-cement ratio. Excluding CSCF, an allocation
of 0.5 MEUAs can be explained by a cement production of 0.92 Mt (with R=95%) or 1.20Mt
(with R=50%).
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yearly fluctuations in output, it is also possible to smooth the allocation by
taking the average of several years, for example the average of t − 2 and t − 3.
5.2.3. Including grinding stations into the scheme
The implementation of hybrid OBA poses additional challenges, one of which
is the inclusion separated grinding stations in the scheme. Other than a few exceptions (emissions trading schemes in China include grinding stations because
the unit of the regulated entity is the cement company, not the installations.),
most ETS schemes only include facilities producing clinker that have direct
emissions. Some trading schemes such as the EU ETS cover only direct emissions but not indirect emissions. Thus including grinding stations with zero
direct emissions could imply significant changes in the legal basis of the ETS.23
In schemes that cover indirect emissions from electricity, heat or steam (scope
2) the inclusion of grinding stations is legally more straightforward.
Other than legal barriers, there may also be problems with perception because the allowances allocation to grinding stations would often be negative
(if cement is produced with a clinker ratio higher than the benchmark). This
is similar to give free allowances to renewable electricity generators alongside
other power plants. It does not pose problem per se (allowances are not physical commodities but financial assets) but represents a conceptual innovation in
emissions trading.
While these barriers exist, as the mitigation targets for the cement sector become more stringent over time, it is likely that the inclusion of grinding
stations will be necessary in order to maximise abatement opportunities and
meet the target. In practical terms, a grinding station can be included as a
sub-installation of a given clinker plant installation, if it is closely linked (geographically or in terms of clinker trade), or as a separate installation.
If their inclusion into the ETS is not possible, a fall back option could be to
implement a hybrid OBA without grinding stations, as is done by the CaliforniaQuebec ETS methodology (see section 8.3). This method can incentivise the
reduction of the clinker ratio in integrated plants and at the same time can
discourage the offshoring of clinker production. However, it is not neutral regarding the production location, and it discourages the production of cement in
grinding stations.
5.2.4. Distortions in the concrete market
A specificity of the sector could cause some inefficiencies in the proposed
scheme: clinker substitution during concrete manufacturing, after the cement
manufacturing stage. Indeed some ready-mixed concrete plants blend clinker
substitutes with ordinary Portland cement, a high clinker ratio cement, instead
of using lower-clinker cement.
23 In the EU ETS this requires fundamental changes to the EU ETS Directive. Grinding stations are also excluded from the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC)
Directive.
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We can expect that hybrid OBA would divert clinker substitutes which used
to be directed to concrete plants. They would be directed instead to cement
plants, which can gain allowances from a decrease in the clinker ratio. Theoretically, considering concrete as the final product, alongside with a “clinker to
concrete” ratio would eliminate this inefficiency, but concrete plants are very
numerous compared to cement plants, hence it would entail heavy administrative costs compared to the gains of the avoided distortion (which is likely to be
small, this practice being rather marginal). There is also a number of slag grinding stations, sometimes belonging to companies not producing clinker, typically
selling slag to concrete plants. These could be part of the scheme by buying
clinker and producing cement.
5.3. Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF)
The current EU ETS allocation methodology includes a Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF), to ensure that the limit on free allowances, determined
by earlier legislation, is not exceeded. This share of free allowances reflects the
burden sharing between the power sector and the manufacturing sector. The
CSCF amounted to 0.9427 in 2013, decreasing by 0.0174 each year to reach
0.8244 in 2020. The California-Quebec ETS, which is based on OBA, also includes a CSCF (called cap adjustment factor) which also declines over time.
How does moving to a hybrid OBA relate to the CSCF?
In the EU, industry strongly disapproved of the implementation of the CSCF,
arguing that it made benchmarks unattainable, and that it would make carbon
costs rise over time to a worrying point.24 However, as the CSCF was already
written in early legislature and voted, it was implemented despite these protests.
Yet the premise that benchmarks are targets to reach, so that installations
at the benchmark level bear no carbon costs, is flawed in the context of the
EU ETS Phase 3 because benchmarks are multiplied by historic (pre-crisis)
output and not by actual output as it is the case in the California-Quebec ETS.
In the EU, many installations with poor environmental performance actually
receive significant overallocation of allowances, and generate “carbon benefits”
or “overallocation profits”. Thus in Phase 3, the CSCF has in fact been reducing
overallocation to sectors.25 However, moving to an output-based allocation is
more effective in terms of reducing over-allocation, and would make the CSCF
obsolete in the short and medium term.
A case could be made for the CSCF to be maintained under a hybrid OBA
(possibly under a different name) to provide a signal towards the long term
scarcity of allowances. Adding another declining factor is compatible with OBA
24 Especially in the cement sector, as two thirds of emissions are process emissions, a decrease
of 1.74% per year of the CSCF must be compensated by an improvement in the “non-process”
carbon efficiency by three times the size, to maintain carbon costs, everything else being equal.
25 Overallocation resulted from the free allocation being based on high production reference
years, and also from the carbon leakage list which included too many sectors (Clò, 2010;
Martin et al., 2014).
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and constitutes a political choice.26 In other words, OBA and CSCF are two
separate issues. However, a long term signal could also be achieved with a
declining benchmark already mentioned previously, in line with a pre-announced
long term mitigation goal based on technology roadmaps.
5.4. Impact of OBA fluctuations on the fixed cap
Unlike ex-ante allocation, an output-based allocation applied to a sector implies that the overall sector allocation is uncapped. A number of approaches
for absorbing this fluctuation within a capped ETS has been discussed, including an adjustment of the auctioning volume (in present or future years), or
an ambition-neutral Allocation Supply Reserve proposed by Ecofys (2014). A
tiered approach whereby carbon leakage sectors are grouped into high, medium
or low exposure levels, and the high exposed sectors are guaranteed to receive
free allowances proportional to 100% output (multiplied by benchmark), and
the “slack” is taken up by adjusting the free allocation to the medium and low
exposure sectors is also discussed within policy circles.27
Whichever approach is used, it is clear that the fluctuation and hence uncertainty should be minimised. We showed in Section 4.3 that the hybrid OBA
is superior to either cement or clinker OBA in this regard.
5.5. Compatibility with World Trade Organization
The WTO was created in order to promote free trade by prohibiting unjustified protectionism or discrimination. The compatibility of border carbon
adjustments, a prominent anti-leakage policy, with the WTO has led to an extensive literature without any consensus on the subject (Ismer and Neuhoff,
2007; Zhang, 2012; Low et al., 2011). The majority of authors argue that BCAs
would violate the general principle of WTO, however whether or not they could
fall under the exception regime (Article XX) is a much debated question.
With hybrid OBA, the geographical origin of clinker imports and the destination of clinker exports has no impact on the quantity of allowances provided.28 Foreign plants are excluded from the scheme so foreign companies are
not directly impacted financially. The level of benchmarks and the output-based
system ensures that incurred carbon costs are low and on average positive, so
that that free allocation does not constitute a discriminating subsidy, penalising
foreign competitors.29 In summary, it is very unlikely that hybrid OBA would
be challenged at the WTO.
26 The intent here is to focus on the design of hybrid OBA for the cement sector and not
discuss at length alternatives for the CSCF.
27 Ref. Interview with policy maker.
28 Some interviewees expressed concerns that the risk of carbon leakage could be mitigated
without considering clinker differently if clinker produced in Europe and imported clinker
from outside Europe. The analysis in section 4.1 proved that hybrid OBA was as efficient as
clinker OBA to disincentivise clinker offshoring.
29 But this is questionable for the current scheme.
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6. Conclusion
We proposed in this paper a hybrid OBA which would solve the clinker
dilemma by bringing the best of clinker OBA and cement OBA. This unique
allocation method can be expressed in one straightforward formula (Equation
11). We have shown that this allocation method is superior to the allocation
methods currently used:
• It provides incentives which are aligned with the mitigation options available to this sector in the short to medium term i.e. it provides an incentive
to reduce the clinker carbon intensity and the clinker to cement ratio while
disincentivising the offshoring of clinker production (see section 4.1).
• On the latter point, while hybrid OBA does not explicitly address the issue
of creating a level playing field between domestic and imported clinker,
our analysis in section 4.1 showed that hybrid OBA is as efficient as clinker
OBA to disincentivise clinker offshoring.
• It expands the scope of mitigation by expanding the ETS to include all
installations (grinding plants and clinker producing facilities) and ensuring a system which is neutral to the production location. For example,
producing lower-carbon cement in grinding stations with cheap access to
clinker substitutes is not penalised, relative to producing higher-carbon
cement in integrated cement-clinker plants (see section 4.2).
• Relative to an OBA with a cement or clinker benchmark, fluctuations of
the total volume of allowances to the sector is minimised with a hybrid
OBA (see section 4.3).
• Relative to ex ante allocation, hybrid OBA ensures the prevention of carbon leakage and reduces the risk of excess allocation.
• Without excess allocation, the benchmarks under hybrid OBA can provide a focal point for energy efficiency improvements if set at sufficiently
ambitious levels.
• It also removes the perverse incentives that occur in some allocation designs, which encourage excess production of clinker in order to obtain more
emission allowances.
We argued that the two common objections to hybrid OBA – administrative
complexity and the geographical heterogeneity of clinker substitutes which give
an advantage to low-carbon cement producers with access to cheap clinker substitutes - do not represent major impediments (see section 5.2 and 5.1.3). The
inclusion of grinding plants into ETS may be difficult legally, politically and
administratively but fall back options exist (see section 5.2.3). We have been
explicit from the beginning about the two more fundamental shortcomings of
this approach:
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• It does not give enough incentive for demand substitution, as it blocks
carbon costs from being reflected in final goods prices.
• It does not promote radical technological innovation in the sector.
Both shortcomings are related because without a carbon price signal, cement
consumers tend to resist against new, untested products which in turn acts as a
barrier for cement producers to reduce the clinker content of cement.30 These are
important impediments to the long-term decarbonisation of the cement sector,
and we therefore argue that hybrid OBA should be seen as a short or medium
term solution, while transitioning to a more robust leakage prevention regime.
Specifically, a consumption levy could be implemented on cement as proposed
in (Neuhoff et al., 2014), to help stimulate demand for low-carbon cement. It
could be applied to clinker (in addition to clinker OBA), but it could also apply
on cement (with possibly lower administrative costs) as an input to concrete.
Another solution for the long term is to implement border carbon adjustments
with full auctioning.
A challenge remains in the long term to close the emissions gap between
what technology roadmaps enable (IEA, 2009), and the emissions trajectories
needed to avoid detrimental climate change. Providing free allocation in proportion to output to this sector may certainly not promote radical innovation, but
auctioning alone may not be sufficient either. Emissions trading schemes must
then be completed with ambitious policies to correct market failures. Significant
public investment will be necessary to bring about carbon dioxide capture and
storage (CCS) demonstration plants. To encourage more efficient use of cement
in buildings or the development of new low-carbon materials, public funding will
likely be necessary as well as changes to building regulations and standards. At
the same time, reforming the ETS will also play an important role. For example
a price floor rising over time, as in the California-Quebec ETS, certainly gives
the right signal to investors in new low-carbon building materials.
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8. Incentives for cement under other OBA designs
8.1. California-Quebec
In the California-Quebec ETS, which includes about 13 integrated cement
plants, the output is the “adjusted clinker and mineral additives produced”, defined as “Clinker Produced × (1 + (Limestone and Gypsum Consumed)/Clinker
Consumed))” (California Air Resources Board, 2011):
ACali = BC,Cali × QK × (1 +

QL,G
)
QIK + QH
K

(18)

QL,G being the quantity of limestone and gypsum consumed. The value of
the benchmark is BCali =0.783 tCO2 (less stringent than the EU ETS benchmark).
The original analytical framework has to be modified to analyse the incentives. In addition to limestone and gypsum QL,G , other substitutes QOS such as
slag or fly ash can be used. We have then QC = QIK +QH
K +QL,G +QOS . Noting
QL,G
QOS
rL,G =
, the proportion of lime and gypsum in cement, and rOS =
,
QC
QC
the proportion of other substitutes in cement, we have R + rL,G + rOS = 1.
The substitution potential for lime and gypsum (reducing R by about 5 to 10
percentage points) is by far less important than the one for other substitutes
(reducing R by more than 50 percentage points).
Rewriting (18), we have
ACali = BCali × QK × (1 +
= BCali × QC ×

rL,G
)
R

1 − τI
× (1 − rOS )
1 − τE

(19)

Then the marginal cost of carbon in cement is equal to:
M CCali =

1 − τI
× [IK − BCali − rOS (IK − BCali ) − rL,G IK ]
1 − τE

(20)

Isocarboncost curves cannot be displayed in the same way as in section 4.1
because there is an additional variable. Figure 4 shows isocarboncost curves
for the California-Quebec ETS in rL,G vs. IK and rOS vs. IK diagrams (τI
vs. IK diagrams is similar to a clinker benchmark, that is importing clinker is
disincentivised). We see that clinker substitution is incentivised, but only for
gypsum and lime. However, the latter is limited to a few percentage points, so
the overall incentive for clinker substitution remains low.
8.2. New Zealand
The NZ ETS, which includes two integrated cement plants, has two benchmarks31 : one for clinker (BK,N Z =0.9392 tCO2 per ton of clinker), and one for
31 http://www.mfe.govt.nz/more/cabinet-papers-and-related-material-search/cabinet-papers/
climate-change/climate-change-and-19
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(a) California-Quebec - rL,G vs. IK

(b) California-Quebec - rOS vs. IK

Figure 4: Isocarboncosts curves for the California-Quebec ETS. From lighter to darker: -0.05,
0, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 EUA/tCement. Reminder: if 1EUA=10e, then 0.10 EUA per ton of
cement translates into 1eper ton of cement. Benchmark value is at BCali =783 kgCO2 per
ton of cement. We suppose τE =0%, τI =0%, rOS =10% in rL,G vs. IK graphs, and rL,G =5%
in rOS vs. IK graphs.

milling clinker into cement (BM = 0.02266 tCO2 per ton of cement), but it only
applies to cement milled from own clinker.
With our notations, we define cement milled from own clinker as (1 − τI )QC ,
that is, if 10% of the clinker is imported, then only 90% of the cement produced
is considered milled from own clinker. The allocation is then:
AN Z = BK,N Z × QK + BM × (1 − τI )QC

(21)

The marginal cost of carbon is equal to:
M CN Z =

1 − τI
× [R(IK − BK,N Z ) − BM (1 − τE )]
1 − τE

(22)

Figure 5 shows isocarboncost curves for the New Zealand scheme, which
are very similar to a clinker OBA (except there is a shift on the right because
benchmarks are much less stringent than in our study).
8.3. Fall-Back option
If we modify the California-Quebec formula by including not only limestone
and gypsum, but all substitutes to clinker, we have (FB stands for fall-back):
AF B = B C ×

QK
R

(23)

Similarly to the California-Quebec OBA, this allocation methodology can
only apply to facilities producing clinker. BC is a cement benchmark, which
can be identical to the one used in cement OBA.
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(a) New Zealand - rL,G vs. IK

(b) New Zealand - rOS vs. IK

Figure 5: Isocarboncosts curves in the New Zealand ETS. From lighter to darker: -0.05, 0,
0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 EUA/tCement. Reminder: if 1EUA=10e, then 0.10 EUA per ton of
cement translates into 1eper ton of cement. Benchmark value are at BK,N Z =0.9392 tCO2
per ton of clinker and BM = 0.02266 tCO2 per ton of cement. We suppose τE =0% (always),
τI =0% in R vs. IK graphs, and R=72% (same as in section 4.1) in τI vs. IK graphs.

The marginal cost of carbon is equal to:
M CF B =

1 − τI
× [R × IK − BC ]
1 − τE

(24)

Figure 6 shows that isocarboncost curves are similar to the hybrid OBA.
Hence, the fallback option gives the appropriate incentives: reducing the clinker
ratio but not offshoring of clinker production.
However, such a system is not neutral regarding the production location. It
disincentivises producing clinker in one installation and using it to manufacture
cement in another installation (separated grinding station or other plant). Let
us consider the same example as in section 4.2 of a company producing QC
cement with a clinker ratio R (so we have QK = R × QC ). An integrated
QK
plant would receive the allocation AIntegratedP lant = BC ×
, while in case of
R
production in two separated installations, the “clinker-only” plant would receive
AClinkerP lant = BC × QK and the other installation would not receive any
allocation (because it would not produce clinker). The total allocation would
QK
then be equal to BC × QK < BC ×
.
R
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(a) Fallback Benchmark - R vs. IK

(b) Fallback Benchmark - τI vs. IK

Figure 6: Isocarboncosts curves. From lighter to darker: -0.05, 0, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15
EUA/tCement. Reminder: if 1EUA=10e, then 0.10 EUA per ton of cement translates into
1eper ton of cement. Benchmark values are at BK =766 kgCO2 per ton of clinker, BC =450
BK
=59%. We suppose τE =0% (always), τI =0% in R
kgCO2 per ton of cement, and BR =
BC
vs. IK graphs, and R=72% (European average in 2012) in τI vs. IK graphs.
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